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A B S T R A C T   
Although China remains the largest producer in the fishery industry worldwide, it faces substantial personal 
injuries and economic losses created by this sector. Considering insurance is a mechanism that potentially could 
deal with fishery-related losses, China set up private fishery insurance in the 1980s, but it largely failed in the 
1990s. Over the past twenty-six years, China has developed an alternative financial mechanism, called fishery 
mutual insurance (FMI) to spread out risks, among which a large number of members are individual fishermen 
and owners of small-scale fishing vessels. Since 2008, there has been increasing financial support for FMI pro-
vided by the government. Guided by non-profitable FMI associations, FMI becomes a model of sharing risks 
among fishermen that create risks, which is substantially more like a risk-sharing agreement than a form of 
insurance. The paper analyzes the potential of this risk-sharing agreement in minimizing the total social costs of 
fishery-related activities in comparison to private insurance. Special interest is also given to identifying the 
problems that will constrain the promotion of FMI in the context of China.   
1. Introduction 
China is the world’s top producer of both wild and farmed fish, and 
since 2002 has also been the largest exporter of fish and fish products.1 
The most recent estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) indicate that approximately 14,6 million people 
in China were active as fishermen or fish farmers in 2016, accounting for 
25% across the world2 Up to 2018, the total value of production in the 
fishery was CNY 1281 billion, holding 1,42% of the nation’s GDP.3 
The fishery sector, including fishing and aquaculture, is facing higher 
risks and more severe natural disasters than other industries.4 
Comparing fatality statistics in the fishing industry with those for other 
occupational categories reveals that fishing is one of the most dangerous 
occupations.5 It was reported that fishermen and related fishing workers 
had the highest fatal injury rate of any occupation since 2005 in the 
world.6 Between 1994 and 2011, approximately 120/100.000 people 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: minzhen.jiang@maastrichtuniversity.nl (M. Jiang), michael.faure@maastrichtuniversity.nl (M. Faure).   
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The state of the world fisheries and aquaculture in 2018, available at http://www.fao.org/3/i9 
540en/i9540en.pdf (last accessed on December 2, 2019). p.30.  
2 Ibid.  
3 In 2018, the total gross domestic production (GDP) in China was CNY 90.03 billion, among which the fishery industry contributed CNY 1281 billion. See National 
Bureau of Statistics of PRC, National economy and society developed statistical bulletin in 2018, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201902/t20190 
228_1651265.html (last accessed on December 2, 2019); also see the Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, The statistical report of national fishery in China in 
2018, available at http://www.cappma.org/view.php?id=3047 (last accessed on December 2, 2019).  
4 Sun, X.; Zhong, F (2008). The welfare economic analysis of crop insurance subsidy (in Chinese). Agricultural Economics, vol. 2, pp. 1–11.  
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), a report on the fatalities in fisheries, available at http://www.fao.org/3/x9656e/X9656E.htm 
(last accessed on December 12, 2019).  
6 Janocha J. (2012). Facts of the catch: occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities to fishing workers, 2003–2009, Beyond the Numbers: Workplace Injuries, Vol. 
1, No. 9 (U S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/facts-of-the-catch-occupational-injuries-illnesses-and-fatalities-to- 
fishing-workers-2003-2009.htm (last accessed on December 2, 2019). 
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died and 832/100.000 people were injured per year according to the 
claim settlement record of the China Fishery Mutual Insurance Associ-
ation (CFMI), the rate of which (fatality and injury) was much higher 
than that of people engaged in other industries in China.7 Some scholars 
argue that the actual losses can be more extensive than the official 
version.8 
The chart below shows the death toll and the amount of direct eco-
nomic losses in the fishery sector from 2010 to 2018.  
Year Fatalities Direct economic losses (billion, CNY) 
2010 242 20.5 
2011 142 25.8 
2012 164 23.7 
2013 165 25.7 
2014 88 21.2 
2015 33 20.0 
2016 165 28.7 
2017 58 17.3 
2018 43 15.7 
Source: the Annual Fishery Statistics Report of China from 2010-20189 
Fishery is generally seen as a high-risk industry, as it can lead to 
personal injuries, economic losses, and environmental damage. On the 
one hand, Chinese coastal areas go through a number of meteorological 
disasters all the year round, while both fishery and aquaculture are the 
sectors that are highly dependent on natural conditions. That is, there is 
a possibility of extreme natural disasters that results in considerable 
damage to fishery activities. On the other hand, although China remains 
the most prominent fish producer in the world, it is a developing country 
with a large percentage of individual fishermen and owners of medium- 
and small-size fishing vessels. Their limited financial conditions are not 
sufficient to technically handle huge fishery risks. Therefore, the prob-
lem of tackling fishery risks is a significant concern in the context of the 
fishery industry in China. 
Insurance has been widely used in agriculture as a means to mitigate 
financial risks and to reduce the negative impacts of natural catastro-
phes. However, an attempt to launch commercial fishery insurance in 
China proved to fail in the late 1980s. During the following two decades, 
China has established a financial mechanism called ‘fishery mutual in-
surance’ (FMI),: a risk-sharing pool financed by individual fishermen 
and fishery companies to share risks. The question arises why private 
insurance failed and why FMI replaced it. This article aims at sketching 
the working of FMI in China in the light of the theoretical literature 
concerning the differences between insurance and risk-sharing. 
The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, section 2 
describes the failure of private insurance in the past as well as the 
attempt to set up mutual insurance since the 1990s. Based on this 
descriptive analysis, section 3 analyzes FMI from the perspective of law 
and economics. The core question in that analysis focuses on why fishery 
insurance failed and what are the conditions which made risk-sharing 
via FMI succeed. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The development of FMI in China 
2.1. Private fishery insurance - a brief history 
A program of fishery insurance in China was initiated in 1982 by the 
People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC)10 as part of the company’s 
agriculture services. The PICC initially monopolized the market. One 
year later, the PICC, together with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), 
issued two normative documents as guidance concerning fishery insur-
ance11 to welcome other insurance companies to enter the market.12 
However, by 1992, the fishery sector proved itself to be an expensive 
class of insurance for both insurers and insured in China: the high risks 
in the fishery sector led to a high premium, yet a high premium caused 
fewer fishermen to purchase this insurance, driving insurance com-
panies to charge an even higher premium and attracted fewer fishermen 
to join. Consequently, most insurance companies pulled out, leaving the 
PICC alone, offering a very limited range of services.13 As a result, 
fishery insurance was gradually abandoned by the PICC due to the large 
losses. Only two types of products related to fishery insurance remained: 
insurance of large fishing vessels and employer’s liability insurance. 
By examining the previous data, Chinese scholars argue that two 
fundamental problems of private insurance led to its failure in the 
7 The above data considering fishing fatalities in China is collected from the 
website of MOA, available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/wnmbss/201401/t2 
0140123_3747712.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 3, 2019). Be-
sides, according to the estimates of the International Maritime Organization, 
the FAO and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
the fishing fatalities related to marine fishing activities are 160–180/100.000 
per year. According to the CFMI, up to 2011, the fatality of fishermen was 120/ 
100.000 per year, and the injury rate was 832/100.000 per year, far beyond the 
rate of people engaged in other high risk sectors, such as coal mining or the 
construction industry. It seems plausible that the fatality rates in countries for 
which data is not available might be higher than it is in those that do keep 
records. More information on fishing fatalities is available at https://www.cdc. 
gov/niosh/docs/2017-171/pdf/2017-171.pdf (in Chinese) (last accessed on 
December 11, 2019).  
8 See Sun Y. (2006). On the risks of fishing men and fishery insurance (in 
Chinese), Chinese Fisheries Economics Insurance Economics, No. 2, pp. 59–63. 
According to Sun’s argument, the real economic losses and the fishing fatality is 
much higher than the official data. There is a high possibility that a great 
number of accidents related to fishery activities were not reported by the 
fishermen; which means, such accidents are not included in the official record, 
and many unregistered fishing vessels are also excluded from the statistics. 
Moreover, due to lack of supervision, owners of quite a few medium- and small- 
sized vessels choose to escape from punishment by concealing accidents. Based 
on Sun’s estimate, the annual rate of the dead and missing is between 1496 and 
4,166, and the fatality rate of people who engaged in fishing would be 
140–164/100.000. The fatality rate of fishermen and related fishing workers is 
24 times higher than that of coal workers and 35 times higher than that of 
workers in the construction industry.  
9 The statistical report of national fishery in China in 2018, available at 
http://www.cappma.org/view.php?id=3047 (in Chinese) (last accessed on 
December 2, 2019). 
10 People’s Insurance Company of China Holdings Company (中国人保控股公 
司) is a state-owned company in China.  
11 The first guidance is the Notice of Implementing Nationwide Fishing Vessel 
Insurance (关于开展国内渔船保险工作的通知) was jointly issued by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry & Fishery (replaced by the Ministry of 
Agriculture since 1988, and then by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Af-
fairs since 2018) and the PICC in December 1983. It required that all the de-
partments related to the fishery sector should encourage fishing vessels to 
purchase commercial insurance. The second guidance is the Provisions on Na-
tional Fishing Vessel Insurance (国内渔船保险条款) was issued by the PICC in 
November 1981.  
12 In 1985, there were China Pingan Insurance (Group) Company Ltd.(中国平 
安保险(集团)股份有限公司), China Life Insurance Company Ltd. (中国人寿保险 
股份有限公司), and a few foreign commercial insurance companies initiated 
fishery insurance products.  
13 Zheng Hui, Mu Hairong, Zhao Xin (2018), Evaluating the demand for 
aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish farmers’ willingness to pay in 
central coastal areas in China, Marine Policy, Vol. 96, pp. 152–162. 
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fishery sector: a high loss ratio and low participation.14 First and fore-
most, the payout/loss ratio of fishery insurance, which is the ratio be-
tween insurance losses incurred and premiums earned in a given period, 
was far beyond the point that a private market can bear. By the end of 
1995, the insurance of fishing vessels accounted for less than 1% of the 
whole market of vessel insurance. The premium income in 1995 was 
CNY 47 million, and the loss ratio was 107%, which was much higher 
than that in the classes of insurance regarding other vessel types.15 
Moreover, the rate of purchasing insurance was low. In 1986 only, 
25.436 out of 239.000 fishing vessels were insured, the ratio of which 
was 10,6%, and it decreased to 5,8% (16.000 out of 273.978 fishing 
vessels were insured) in 1995.16 Moreover, the majority of insured ships 
were medium- and small-size fishing vessels owned by companies and 
individual fishermen, while few vessels owned by State-owned com-
panies were insured. 
2.2. FMI: an attempt towards risk-sharing 
Since private insurance for the fishery sector was thus deemed un-
successful,17 the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly determined to establish a non-profit so-
cial organization called China Fishing Vessel Owner’s Mutual Insurance 
Association in July 1994, which was renamed as the China Fishery 
Mutual Insurance Association (hereinafter CFMI) in October 2007.18 
The CFMI aims to promote a financial mechanism to share risks between 
the owners of fishing vessels, fishermen and fish farmers, as well as other 
shareholders related to fishery activities. All the individual fishermen, 
owners of fishing vessels, and fishery companies can join the association 
on a voluntary basis. Over the past 26 years (1994-now), fishery mutual 
insurance (FMI) has gone through a series of continued adjustments in 
terms of both programs and practices. It has gradually replaced private 
fishery insurance in China. 
FMI is similar to insurance as it also covers fishery risks via pooling. 
However, in the case of FMI, it is the risk creators (which are fishermen 
and fishery companies), but not commercial insurers that aggregate 
resources to provide coverage for their risks.19 The risk-sharing model 
among risk creators is reiterated by the Pilot Measures for the Supervision 
and Administration of Mutual Insurance Organizations (hereinafter Mutual 
Insurance Measure)20 in 2015, where it describes FMI more like a risk- 
sharing agreement than like insurance. It is because FMI associations 
aim at sharing risks among fishermen themselves via pooling rather than 
to resort to a third party the insurance company. The adoption of the 
term ‘fishery mutual insurance’ (in Chinese:渔业互助保险) to represent 
this risk-sharing agreement is slightly misleading as risk-sharing has to 
be distinguished from insurance, pursuing risk guarantee from a third 
party.21 Fishermen establish a risk-sharing agreement by joining the 
association and paying the membership fees as the contribution. The 
contribution is similar to the premiums charged by commercial insurers 
in a private insurance setting, the amount of which is different under 
specific circumstances, depending upon the factors like the size of ves-
sels, the accident records in the past, etc.22 In cases where one member 
suffers from losses during fishery activities, other members will inter-
vene in the compensation of the covered risks via pooling. As the 
fundamental aim of FMI is to provide a risk-sharing mechanism at an 
affordable price. The price of membership fees excludes profit. There-
fore, fishermen under FMI are awarded compensation at a lower cost 
compared to private insurance.23 
The resources of FMI mainly include (a) membership fees, which are 
contributions collected from individual members, and (b) governmental 
subsidies. Apart from interests received from the bank and charitable 
donations, FMI associations also promote micro-finance services in the 
fishery industry to activate the funds, which include micro-credit, micro- 
deposit, and micro-insurance. To be precise, FMI associations make use 
of deposits to provide services for the family aquaculture and small-scale 
vessel owners who find it difficult to get loans from formal financial 
institutions. As fishery micro-finance providers, FMI associations not 
14 For example, Ge Guanghua, Lou Yong (1997), Current Status and Prospect 
of China Fishery Insurance (in Chinese), China Fishery and Economy Research, 
vol.6, pp.22–24; also see Zheng Hui, Mu Harirong, Zhao Xin (2018), Evaluating 
the demand for aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish farmers’ will-
ingness to pay in central coastal areas in China, Marine Policy, vol. 96, pp. 
152–162; Chen, Shengwei, Wang, Xiaoli, (2017), Literature Review on the 
Chinese Fishery Mutual Insurance (in Chinese), Journal of Ocean University of 
China (Social Science part), vol.2, pp.67–70; Jia Qingru, Chen Shengwei (2015), 
Analysis of the Development and Dilemma of Fishery Insurance in China (in 
Chinese), Shandong Agriculture Science, 2015, 47(8), pp. 148–152, 156; a dis-
cussion of these problems is provided in infra section 4.  
15 Ge Guanghua, Lou Yong (1997), Current Status and Prospect of China 
Fishery Insurance (in Chinese), China Fishery and Economy Research, vol. 6, pp. 
22–23.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Zheng Hui, Mu Harirong, Zhao Xin (2018), Evaluating the demand for 
aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish farmers willingness to pay in 
central coastal areas in China, Marine Policy,vol. 96, pp. 152–162.  
18 The Ministry of Civil Affairs made the decision to establish the CFMI, and it 
is a non-profit organization regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs. See Tuo Guozhu (2012), The improvement and development of Fishery 
Mutual Insurance in China (in Chinese), Journal of Insurance Professional College, 
vol.26 no.1, pp.5–11. 
19 Doucette, J. E. (2002). Wading in the pool: Interlocal cooperation in 
municipal insurance and the state regulation of public entity risk sharing pools- 
A survey. Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, vol. 8 (2), pp. 533–568.  
20 Pilot Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Mutual Insurance 
Organizations (相互保险组织监管试行办法) was issued by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (was replaced by China Banking Insurance Regulatory 
Commission in 2018) on Jan 23, 2015. Article 2 states that ‘mutual insurance 
means the insurance activities whereby entities or individuals with the same 
kind of risk protection demand become members by entering into a contract. All 
the members pay insurance premiums to form a mutual fund that compensates 
for losses incurred from any incident specified in the contract.’ Besides, ‘mutual 
insurance organization means an organization owned by its members and 
providing insurance service for its members in the form of cooperation on the 
basis of equality, free will and democratic management, including general 
mutual insurance organizations, and specialized or regional mutual insurance 
organizations, among others.’ 
21 See further on the differences between risk-sharing agreements and insur-
ance, Liu, J. and Faure, M.(2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environ-
mental damage: theory and practice, International Environmental Agreements, 
vol. 18, pp. 255–273.  
22 See the Policy of Employer’s Liability Mutual Insurance of CFMI (2017). Also 
see the Policy of Fishing Vessel Mutual Insurance of CFMI (2017).  
23 Generally speaking, fishermen pay approximately several hundred to 
several thousand of RMB (= approx.dozens to hundreds of euros) for personal 
accident mutual insurance or fishing vessel mutual insurance on the contribu-
tion, the amount of which varies between different towns and provinces. For 
example, in Dongshan District of Fujian Province, subsidies from Fujian Prov-
ince and Dongshan County are respectively covered 30% and 10% of the con-
tributions in 2014, while the shipowner undertakes the rest 60% of the 
contribution. All the workers on the fishing vessel can get a CNY 150,000 
compensation for accidental injury after paying CNY 198 to their shipowners, 
meaning the money paid to FMIs are from both employers and employees. The 
compensation on medical expenses is capped at CNY 15,000 The above data is 
reported by the CFMI, available at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=cont 
ent&c=index&a=show&catid=30&id=45 (in Chinese) (last accessed on 
December 11, 2019). 
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only take advantage of liquidizing the funds but also provide an alter-
native for those low-income households to start their fishery business.24 
Considering the non-profit feature of FMI associations, strict re-
quirements are set to restrict their business.25 
The territorial scope of FMI covers all the coastal provinces, and key 
inland provinces specialized in the fishery industry in China. Currently, 
CFMI has founded local offices in three sea areas (i.e., Huang-Bo Sea 
area, East Sea area, South Sea area) and over twenty provinces and 
cities.26 In the meanwhile, nine coastal provinces and cities that are 
principally engaged in fishery established their respective FMI associa-
tions, namely Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hainan provinces and Ningbo city (subject to Zhejiang 
province). Note that the offices in the local areas are subject to CFMI and 
undertake specific tasks required by CFMI. By contrast, nine FMI asso-
ciations of local regions are separated from CFMI and take risks on their 
own, but they may take guidance from the CFMI. In other words, a risk 
pool created by a local FMI association is isolated from the CFMI or other 
eight local FMI associations, which means, it has to carry the burden 
alone in case an accident occurs.27 The organizational structure of the 
risk-sharing in the fishery sector is therefore rather diffuse: the (central) 
CFMI has local offices in many provinces, but in addition some provinces 
and cities created their own FMI associations, which are not related to 
the CFMI. Later it will be explained that there are different models of 
organization, depending upon the specific provinces.28 The fact that 
each FMI principally works on its own may weaken the capacity of 
controlling and remedying risks, especially when the fishery losses are 
too large for the risk pool of one local FMI association. 
The Chinese government expects that FMI can provide a financial 
alternative for individuals and companies that engage in fishery activ-
ities to share potential risks and compensate losses in cases where 
damage occurs. According to the data published by CFMI, the overall 
loss ratio of FMI between 2001 and 2007 was around 40%, which was 
much lower in comparison to that of private fishery insurance of the 
PICC (100%) or other private insurance products mentioned above.29 
The data from the MOA reveals that 5,78 million fishermen and 360,000 
fishing vessels were insured via FMI from 1994 to 2010, providing a 
total cover of CNY 385 billion.30 By the end of 2014, the total 
compensation payment provided by FMI was CNY 3,3 billion.31 
However, only 30% of fishermen and 25% of fishing fleets were 
covered by FMI. A pilot program of aquaculture also had a limited 
coverage purchased by several large companies. The covered area under 
the FMI program was around 53,360 km2 in 2012,32 covering no more 
than 1% of China’s total aquaculture area.33 Given that the majority 
members of FMI associations are individual fishermen or owners of 
medium- and small-scale fishing vessels, the risk pool created by them 
was relatively limited to share substantial risks. 
2.3. Government subsidies 
2.3.1. Central subsidies 
In order to expand the coverage of FMI and enhance its capabilities of 
undertaking risks, the MOA issued the ‘Notice Regarding the Pilot Project 
of the Central Government’s Contribution Subsidies for Fishery Mutual In-
surance’ in 2008.34 It was the first time that the government initiated a 
pilot program aiming at subsidizing the fishery sector. The total amount 
of subsidies by the central government reaches CNY 10 million per year, 
aiming at two products: fishing vessel insurance with a coverage in case 
of total loss only and personal accident mutual insurance of fisherman, 
which is jointly offered by the central and local governments.35 It 
initiated a trial of subsidized programs in key coastal provinces that are 
engaged in fishing, among which the program of fishing vessel mutual 
insurance was developed in seven coastal provinces. One county of the 
Zhejiang Province initiated a trial program of personal accident mutual 
insurance.36 Fishermen were entitled to receive contribution subsidies 
that cover 25% of fishing vessel mutual insurance and personal accident 
mutual insurance,37 and the maximum compensation amount in the 
second scenario reached CNY 200,000 per person. After a six-year 
attempt, as the subsidy on contributions benefits a growing number of 
fishermen, the Central Government decided to reduce subsidy rates of 
24 Xiaojing Wang (2015), Micro-finance in Fisheries in China (in Chinese), 
Open of Social Sciences, vol. 3, pp. 1–4.  
25 Article 4 of the Mutual Insurance Measure.  
26 FMI local offices are located in over twenty provinces and cities, including 
Tianjin, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Hainan. A distribution map is available 
at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index 
&a=lists&catid=14 (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 11, 2019).  
27 Wan Jie (2012), Problems and countermeasures of fishery mutual insurance 
in China (in Chinese), Chinese Fisheries Economics, vol. 30 (6), p.18–22.  
28 See infra section 2.5.  
29 The original data of the figure is from the Chinese Fishery Yearbook of 
2007. The loss rates were respectively 49% (2001), 55% (2002), 42% (2003), 
40.42% (2004), 38.49% (2005), 53% (2006). Also see, Jia Xianfei, Liu Haiying, 
Tong Chunfen (2012), Necessity and Policy Option of Government Intervention 
of Fishery Insurance (in Chinese), Guihai Tribune, vol.28, pp. 90–94. Note that 
this concerns the performance of FMI from 2001 to 2006, before the involve-
ment of government subsidies. 
30 Xinhua News, The accumulative total cover offered by fishery mutual in-
surance in China reached CNY 385 billion(2011-11-03), available at http 
://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-11/03/content_1985308.htm (in Chinese) (last 
accessed on March 21, 2020).  
31 China Ocean News, The amount of government subsidies on FMI reaches 
CNY 3.3 billion (2015-12-15), available at http://www.oceanol.com/jingji/ji 
nrongtouzi/2015-12-15/54395.html (in Chinese) (last accessed on March 21, 
2020). 
32 It was reported that the covered area under the FMI program was 80,000 
mu2 in 2012, which equals 53,360 km2, the former of which is a traditional unit 
of measurement in China. Generally, 1 mu2 is equal to 667 m2.  
33 Qin Liu, Zhai Liushuan (2015). On the Current Status and Development of 
Aquaculture insurance (in Chinese). Fishery Information & Strategy, vol.30 (1), 
pp.10–16.  
34 Early in 2004, the central government prompted a policy-oriented program 
on agriculture insurance and selected several provinces to develop this pilot 
program with government subsidies. In 2008, the Notice Regarding the Pilot 
Project of the Central Government’s contribution Subsidies for Fishery Mutual In-
surance (农业部关于下达2008年渔业互助保险中央财政保费补贴试点项目资金 
的通知) was issued by the MOA.  
35 Although the central government initiated the subsidy program in 2008, 
there was a financial gap in practice. It was reported that the gap reached CNY 
26 million after a six-year attempt (from 2008 to 2013), among which the 
funding gap in 2013 was around CNY 5.5 million. In order to raise sufficient 
money for the program, the local governments were also asked to bear the duty 
of providing subsidies. Since 2011, except for Hainan Province, whose gov-
ernment has been able to cover the financial gap on its own, all other provinces 
deal with the gap with the CFMI together. See Fishery Department of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), see http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/wnmbss 
/201401/t20140123_3747712.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed on January 19, 
2020). 
36 Generally, the seven coastal provinces have a better performance in eco-
nomic growth, including Liaoning (辽宁), Shandong (山东), Jiangsu (江苏), 
Zhejiang (浙江), Fujian (福建), Guangdong (广东) and Hainan (海南) Province. 
The program selected the Daishan County of Zhejiang Province (浙江省岱山县) 
as the only area to initiate the experimental program of personal accident 
mutual insurance in 2008. In 2013, the central government decided to expand 
the trial program of fishing vessel mutual insurance to two more areas- Tang-
shan City of Hebei Province (河北省唐山市) and Qinzhou City of Guangxi 
Province (广西省钦州市)- in addition to the seven provinces.  
37 CFMI, The significant events of China Fishery Mutual Insurance Association 
in 2008, available at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index 
&a=lists&catid=74 (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 3, 2019). 
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both mutual insurance from 25% to 20% in 2013, keeping the total 
amount of the subsidy at CNY 10 million.38 
2.3.2. Local subsidies 
In response to the national policy, local governments not only spare a 
certain amount of money to the subsidies of CNY 10 million with the 
central government but also establish particular funds to subsidize the 
FMI on their own.39 The amount of money provided by all levels of local 
governments to support the trial programs reached CNY 86,8 million in 
2008.40 While the subsidy on contributions for fishery and aquaculture 
had yet to be included in the central budget, there were de facto several 
local areas providing budgetary allocations for contribution subsidy to 
fishery and aquaculture mutual insurance, such as Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Hainan.41 Furthermore, several provinces and cities became pioneers in 
subsidizing aquaculture mutual insurance, including Shanghai City, 
Chengdu City (of Sichuan), Shishi City (of Fujian), Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
etc. The subsidy on contributions can come either from the local gov-
ernment or their FMI associations.42 
The subsidy rate of contributions varies from place to place based on 
their economic development status, ranging from 20% to 80%. The 
subsidy, as expected, has encouraged more fish farmers to join the FMI. 
The high percentage of subsidy for aquaculture (above 50%) in several 
provinces (i.e., Sichuan, Jiangsu, and Shanghai) proved to be a strong 
incentive for participation.43 
According to the official statement, the development of FMI 
increased as a result of government subsidies. The number of insured 
fishermen and fishing vessels in 2013 increased respectively by 85% and 
90% in comparison with those in 2007. By the end of 2013, 21.220 
fishing vessels and 21.267 fishermen enjoyed the subsidies nation-
wide.44 However, the number of fishermen that benefited from this 
subsidy merely accounted for 2,5%. Although fishermen from relatively 
developed provinces (such as Shanghai, Zhejiang, Shandong) may also 
receive contribution subsidies from their local governments, the 
remaining fishermen have to pay the full price for the contribution 
without subsidies, which drives plenty of them to take risks on their own 
rather than joining FMI associations. Reportedly, the rates of purchasing 
fishing vessel or personal accident mutual insurance were respectively 
20% and 40% in 2013. This relatively low coverage prevented the 
further expansion of FMI.45 
2.4. Partnership with commercial insurers 
Although private insurance was proven to be unsuccessful and was 
then abandoned in the early 1990s, it became increasingly clear that FMI 
was also faced with similar problems as private insurance: a relatively 
high contribution and a limited number of participants. Even with the 
subsidies from the government, FMI associations, as non-profit organi-
zations, still had limited financial capabilities to provide sufficient 
funds. It is against this background that several provinces also paid 
attention to insurance companies again. This time, instead of promoting 
a purely private market, insurance companies either jointly insure 
fishery risks with FMI associations or undertake reinsurance.46 The 
reason behind this is to control the losses that FMI associations may 
potentially suffer. In other words, insurance companies will prevent FMI 
associations from financial ruin, thereby protecting fishermen and 
owners of fishing vessels from under-compensation. 
2.5. Four models of FMI in practice 
With the involvement of the government, the fishery sector in China 
is currently operated by both FMI associations and commercial in-
surers.47 Local governments have been following the central govern-
ment to step in providing various subsidies to their FMI associations in 
recent years, and these associations are currently in the process of 
attempting an appropriate approach to fit in with their actual situation. 
Therefore, they may not stick to one model but could adopt several 
models depending upon the specific products they offer. The samples 
introduced below are not the only models in that area, but typical cases 
initially developed in that area and are therefore worth examining. 
The first model is that CFMI and local FMI associations jointly 
establish a risk pool to share risks mutually. The governments of Ningbo 
and Zhejiang respectively started subsiding FMI in 2005 and 2012, and 
the business is in the hands of local FMI Associations.48 Although 
receiving subsidies from the government, the associations run their 
business independently. 
The second model is also jointly run by CFMI and local FMI associ-
ations, but the relationship between them is not coinsurance but rein-
surance. In Shandong Province, a reinsurance arrangement is made 
between the local FMI Association and the CFMI so as to mitigate risks 
and limit the losses arising from insured fishery activities. Since 2008, 
the Shandong Provincial Oceanic and Fishery Department has decided 
38 Fishery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the information is 
available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/wnmbss/201401/t20140123_37477 
12.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 11, 2019).  
39 CFMI, The significant events of China Fishery Mutual Insurance Association 
in 2008, available at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index 
&a=lists&catid=74 (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 3, 2019. All levels 
of local governments include governments at the provincial, municipal, and 
county levels.  
40 See Lu Li (2012), The Study of Financial Policy on the Development of 
Liaoning Marine Economy (in Chinese), Liaoning Academic Project (Project 
number: 11C026), pp.11–12. Also, see Wan Jie (2012), Problems and coun-
termeasures of fishery mutual insurance in China (in Chinese), Journal of China 
Fishery Economy, vol. 6, p. 18. 
41 Yuan Xinhua, Tipparat Pongthanapanic et al. (2017), Fishery and aqua-
culture insurance in China, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1139, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (FAO). Pp. 28–29.  
42 See, A summary of all the policies concerning aquaculture insurance in 
China (in Chinese), Journal of China Fishery Mutual Insurance (2014), vol. 3, p. 
21. 
43 Yuan Xinhua, Tipparat Pongthanapanich et al. (2017), Fishery and aqua-
culture insurance in China, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1139, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (FAO). Pp. 28–29.  
44 Fishery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, The subsidies the from 
Central Government improves the fishery activities (2014-01-23), available at 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/wnmbss/201401/t20140123_3747712.htm (in 
Chinese) (last accessed on December 11, 2019). 
45 CFMI, To involve fishery mutual insurance into the scope of the subsidies 
given by Central Government (2014-03-11), available at http://www.cfmi.org. 
cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=42&id=732 (in Chinese) 
(last accessed on December 11, 2019).  
46 See infra section 2.5, where specific examples of both models are 
introduced.  
47 Zheng Hui, Mu Harirong, Zhao Xin (2018), Evaluating the demand for 
aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish farmers’ willingness to pay in 
central coastal areas in China, Marine Policy, vol. 96, pp. 152–162.  
48 The guidance on FMI in Ningbo City and Zhejiang Province are provided by 
local administrative measures, namely the Measures for the Administration of 
Fishery Mutual Insurance in Ningbo City (宁波市渔业互助保险管理办法), Interim 
Measures for the Management of Social Funds for Subsides for Fishery Mutual In-
surance (浙江省政策性渔业互助保险补贴专项资金管理暂行办法), and the Notice 
of Strengthening the Pilot Program of Aquaculture Mutual Insurance of Zhejiang 
Province’ (浙江省水产养殖互助保险试点实施方案). The full text is available at 
http://www.zfmi.com/zfmi/news/2017041000002.html (in Chinese) (last 
accessed on December 12, 2019). 
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to allocate CNY 6 million to the Association.49 Therefore, the mutual is 
run by the local FMI Association with a subsidy from the Shandong 
Government, but reinsurance is provided by the (central) CFMI. Mean-
while, according to the announcement by the Shandong Provincial Tax 
Bureau, the contributions received by the Shandong FMI Association are 
exempted from business tax as a form of financial support from the 
government. The Guangdong FMI Association has also started a similar 
reinsurance model since 2006. However, it only receives direct subsidies 
from the government, and no tax privileges are given. 
Commercial insurers and CFMI create the third model. Since 2006, 
the Shanghai Anxin Agricultural Insurance Company (hereinafter Anxin 
Company)50 and CFMI have financed fishing vessel mutual insurance 
with the proportion of 1:1, among which Anxin Company is in charge of 
collecting contributions and compensating claims, while the CFMI 
Shanghai Office takes care of procedural issues, such as contacting the 
government and implementing policies.51 The basic products-fishing 
vessel mutual insurance and personal accident mutual insurance are 
covered under this model (later expanded to aquaculture mutual in-
surance). In the meantime, as a commercial insurer, Anxin Company 
also develops private insurance of agricultural products that can bring 
benefits, in which way to balance the relatively high loss ratio of FMI. 
Similarly, CFMI also develops this model in Fujian Province by inviting a 
commercial insurer, Fujian PICC.52 
The fourth model is adopted by Hainan Province, where the CFMI 
instead of a commercial company becomes the main party under the 
fishing vessel mutual insurance and personal accident mutual insur-
ance.53 With the assistance of commercial insurers, the Hainan CFMI 
Office is responsible for providing policies, handling cases, and 
compensating claims. For example, the Hainan FMI Association pro-
motes two levels of the compensation amount: A and B.54 Fishermen 
with A level enjoy a total compensation of CNY 260.000, consisting of 
CNY 250.000 for personal injury and CNY 10.000 for medical expenses. 
The contribution to this coverage is CNY 600. By comparison, fishermen 
with B level can receive a maximum of CNY 520.000 in compensation, of 
which CNY 500.000 for personal injury and 20.000 for medical ex-
penses. For this coverage, the contribution is paid of CNY 1.200.55 In 
Hainan, the contributions to be paid by fishermen are subsidized up to 
60% so that fishermen only need to pay 40% of the contribution, which 
amounts to CNY 240 and CNY 480 receptively to enjoy the coverage.56 
FMI currently dominates the fishery sector in China with a propor-
tion of 95% shares of the insurance market, while commercial fishery 
insurance only serves a complementary role that provides little coverage 
and holds less than 5% shares, including large-scale fishing vessel 
insurance and employer’s liability insurance.57 Compared to the pure 
private market, FMI, especially subsidized FMI, seems to have a better 
performance of handling risks arising from fishery activities in China.58 
3. Analysis 
3.1. Starting points 
The case of risk-sharing between fishermen in China is an interesting 
one from the perspective of the law and economics literature on the 
choice between insurance and risk-sharing,59 but also from the 
perspective of the economic literature related to first party insurance for 
disasters.60 The demand of fishermen for cover can be related to a wide 
variety of risks, such as personal injury, damage to or loss of the vessel or 
pure economic loss, for example resulting from dramatic weather con-
ditions, typhoons or hurricanes. Some of these risks may be systemic, in 
the sense that the risks are correlated and may not just happen to one 
fisherman, like in the case of a typhoon,61 but other risks may just relate 
to that particular fisherman (for example losses due to mechanical 
failure of the vessel). The starting point is that especially for larger 
losses, fishermen will have a demand for cover as they will more 
particularly be averse against the risks of those larger losses. This cover 
can be provided either through commercial insurance or through risk- 
sharing whereby the case of the Chinese fishermen shows that risk- 
sharing (the FMI) apparently succeeded where insurance failed. The 
law and economics literature may provide an explanation for that. 
3.2. Demand and supply for disaster insurance 
Empirical evidence has demonstrated that individuals often under-
insure for disasters. This was, for example, shown for the ‘flood of the 
century’ of the River Elbe in Germany62 as well as especially in the US 
after Katrina.63 Several reasons are indicated for this low demand for 
disaster insurance. First, as a result of cognitive limitations, low prob-
ability events like natural disasters are systematically misjudged, 
resulting in an “it will not happen to me” attitude.64 Second, people 
often prefer ex ante uncertain losses, rather than the certain loss incurred 
by paying the premium. Disaster insurance is wrongly considered as an 
“investment” and since there may be no return on the “investment” 
during a lifetime, there can be low demand.65 Third, some literature 
indicates that also ex post government relief (i.e., provided after a 
disaster) may reduce incentives to purchase insurance coverage.66 
49 Yang Wensheng (2012), The research on operating conditions of the fishery 
mutual insurance of Shandong Province (in Chinese), Insurance Studies, No. 6, 
pp. 49–57. The announcement of the tax exemption for the Shandong FMI 
Association was issued in August 2006.  
50 Anxin Agricultural Insurance Co Ltd. (上海安信农业保险公司) was founded 
in Shanghai in 2004. It is the first specialized agricultural insurance company, 
providing insurance services for agriculture, rural areas and farmers living in 
the city.  
51 Sun Yingshi (2008), Several models of subsidized FMI in practice in China 
(in Chinese), The Proceedings of the Chinese Fisheries Economics Forum in 
2008, pp. 31–36.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Zheng, Zailin, CFMI Hainan office, An introduction of fishery mutual insurance in Hainan province 
(2019-03− 04), available at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=content 
&c=index&a=show&catid=20&id=2831 (in Chinese) (last accessed on Nov 26, 
2019).  
54 Clause 9 of the Policy of Personal Accident Mutual Insurance of Hainan FMI 
Association (2019) (海南省渔民共保体渔民海上人身意外伤害保险条款).  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Dong, Chenghui, (2016), A Study on the Commercial Fishery Insurance in 
China (in Chinese), Journal of China Insurance, vol. 5, pp. 36–39.  
58 Ibid.  
59 See inter alia Liu J., Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover 
environmental damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agree-
ments: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 18 (2), pp. 255–273.  
60 See Kunreuther, H.(1996), Mitigating disaster losses through insurance, 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 12, pp. 171–187.  
61 See further Faure M., Hartlief T.(2003), Insurance and expanding systemic 
risks. Financial Market Trends, pp.145–156. 
62 Endres, A., Ohl, C., & Rundshagen, B. (2003). Land unter. In Ein institu-
tionenökonomischer Zwischenruf, List Forum für Wirtschafts-und Finanzpolitik 
Bd, vol. 29, pp. 284–294; Schwarze, R. and Wagner, G.(2004) ,In the Aftermath 
of Dresden. New directions in German flood insurance, Geneva Papers on Risk 
and Insurance, vol. 29 (2), pp. 154–168.  
63 Daniels, R.F., Kettl, D.F. et al. (2006), On risk and disaster: lessons from 
hurricane Katrina, Philadephia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press.  
64 Kunreuther, H.(1996), Mitigating disaster losses through insurance, Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 12, p. 175. 
65 Slovic, P., Fischoff, B. et al. (1977), Preference for insurance against prob-
ably small losses: insurance implications, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 
44, pp. 237–258.  
66 It is a point especially made by Epstein, R.A. (1996), Catastrophic responses 
to catastrophic risks, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 12, pp. 287–308. 
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Problems may not only occur on the demand-side but on the supply- 
side as well. Given the “difficult to predict” nature of disasters and more 
particularly the correlation that may occur in case of catastrophes, they 
could endanger the financial viability of insurance companies.67 Given 
the uncertainty (also related to the low probability of disasters), insurers 
may add a risk premium to deal with insurer ambiguity,68 resulting in 
high premiums. If premiums are high, that may result in lower demand. 
The end result can first of all be that there is no demand for the insur-
ance, at least not against the premiums that insurers are charging. The 
second problem is that only a few insured may be interested in taking 
cover, resulting in a relatively small risk pool, which subsequently en-
dangers the risk-spreading. As risk spreading (either via insurance or 
risk-sharing) relies on the law of large numbers, a sufficiently large risk 
pool is necessary in order to be able to provide cover. 
Those problems typically also occurred in the insurance of fisheries 
in China. Also fishermen may have weak awareness of their exposure to 
risk and may consider the probability of catastrophic loss as very un-
likely as a result of which a too low demand would occur. That may 
endanger the constitution of a large enough risk pool. Of course the 
question arises whether some of those problems can more easily be 
remedied within the context of a risk-sharing agreement than via 
traditional insurance. 
3.3. Risk-sharing versus insurance in handling moral hazard and adverse 
selection 
Every type of financial coverage, either via insurance or via risk- 
sharing, entails the risk of moral hazard. Moral hazard means that the 
risk creators’ motif to prevent loss tends to change after obtaining the 
coverage since the risk of paying large amounts of losses is removed or 
reduced.69 It can come under two angles: before the accident (ex ante) 
fishermen may no longer sufficiently invest in risk reduction as a result 
of the coverage provided; after the accident (ex post) moral hazard may 
imply that a fisherman attempts to obtain benefits that he is not entitled 
to.70 It makes it more difficult for the insurers or the pool to evaluate the 
actual losses. A real-life example of moral hazard in China concerned a 
case where fishermen intentionally sank their seafood to the bottom of 
the sea to create an artificial scene with significant losses. After being 
compensated by the insurer, fishermen would recover their seafood and 
restart their business.71 
Insurance may also be vulnerable to adverse selection, which refers 
to “the tendency of persons with a relatively greater exposure to risk to 
seek insurance protection”.72 Adverse selection is the well-known 
problem that insurance will always be attractive for those with rela-
tively greater risk exposure who will therefore seek insurance protec-
tion.73 If the insurer were unable to narrow risk pools through risk 
differentiation, premiums would become too high for the good risks 
which would leave the pool, potentially leading to an unraveling of risk 
pools.74 Both problems may also arise under FMI, but can probably be 
remedied in an easier manner under risk-sharing than under insurance. 
The core of a risk-sharing agreement is that risks are not shifted to a 
third party (an insurance company), but that risks are shared among the 
members based on an ex ante agreement on ex post sharing of losses.75 
Members in a risk-sharing pool usually possess similar risks, common 
knowledge of the possible moral hazard, repeated exchanges and are 
subject to similar reputational remedies as well as social control.76 
First and foremost, a crucial element in any coverage system relates 
to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, both of which are 
related to the lack of information of insurers (or a risk pool) concerning 
the particular risk posed by specific insured or members in the pool. One 
advantage of risk-sharing is that, unlike in the case of commercial in-
surance, full information in order to charge ex ante premiums should not 
necessarily be available. Risk-sharing agreements can deal with uncer-
tain risks for which statistical data are rare. As long as a risk differen-
tiation can be made among the members, a risk-sharing agreement can 
be feasible since an ex ante charging of premiums is in principle not 
necessary. Only the relative contribution of each member to the pool has 
to be known. This is de facto also how the risk-sharing between fisher-
men in China works. The (central) CFMI has sub-district offices at local 
levels, and it is the local fishermen in the same fishing village or 
neighboring village that constitute the risk pool.77 In a risk-sharing 
agreement like FMI all the insured, in this case, are also the insurers. 
Compared with the relationship between commercial insurers and 
insured fishermen under private insurance, it is clear that the local 
fishermen under FMI are more familiar with each other. Consequently, 
information asymmetry may not be a major concern. 
In addition, as FMIs are organized at the level of provinces, they may 
have good knowledge about the specific location and the circumstances 
that influence the risk. Thus the operator of the FMI pool may well be 
able to differentiate premiums according to the specific risk posed by the 
individual fisherman, thus remedying both adverse selection and moral 
hazard.78 FMIs do indeed engage in detailed monitoring as predicted by 
theory. Monitoring in the case of preventing fishery risks is crucial to 
ensure that the desirable precaution is taken. The monitoring measures 
under fishery insurance and risk-sharing agreements operate differ-
ently.79 Under an insurance policy, it is the insurer that monitors the 
behavior of insured fishermen. By contrast, in a risk-sharing agreement, 
mutuality is created whereby the contribution paid by one member 
67 See Gollier, C.(2005), Some aspects of the economics of catastrophe risk 
insurance, in Catastrophic risks and Insurance, Paris, OECD Publishing, vol. 8, 
pp. 13–30.  
68 Kunreuther, H., Hogarth, R. and Meszaros, J. (1993), ‘Insurer ambiguity and 
market failure’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 7 (1), pp. 81–87.  
69 Steven Shavell (1979), On moral hazard and insurance, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, pp. 541–62. Also, see Wagner G.(2007), Un-insurability and the 
choice between market insurance and public compensation systems, in Van 
Boom, W.H. and Faure, M. (eds.), Shifts in Compensation Between Private and 
Public Systems, Vienna, Springer, p. 95.  
70 See generally on moral hazard and its remedies, Shavell, S. (1979), On 
moral hazard and insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 541–562.  
71 Similar examples actually happened in the 1980s in China, which was 
discussed during an interview with the vice general manager of the PICC 
Qingdao branch, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/consume/puguangt 
ai/20110120/17139286425.shtml (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 4, 
2019).  
72 Priest, G. (1987), The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 96, p. 1541. 
73 Arrow, K. J. (2001), Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care 
(American economic review, 1963). Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 
vol. 26 (5), pp. 851–883.  
74 Priest, G. (1987), The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 96, p. 1521–1590.  
75 Liu J, Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol. 18(2), p. 260.  
76 Liu J, Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, 18(2), p. 261.  
77 Yang Wensheng (2012), The research on operating conditions of the fishery 
mutual insurance of Shandong Province, Insurance Studies, 6, pp. 51.  
78 This is considered an important theoretical advantage of risk-sharing. See 
Liu J, Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental dam-
age: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics, vol. 18 (2), p. 261.  
79 Ibid. 
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depends on the claims made by all other members.80 It is in the interests 
of all other members’ claims to be as low as possible, and thus a mutual 
interest of risk minimization is created.81 In order to reduce risks, the 
fishermen of such a group have incentives to differentiate risks. That will 
imply to align a member’s contribution to the risks that each member 
poses and to monitor each other. A certain level of trust is crucial to 
building this mutuality. Therefore, members in a risk-sharing pool 
usually pose similar risks, shared knowledge of the possible moral 
hazard, repeated exchanges, subject to a similar reputation and other 
social controls.82 The fishermen members are faced with the same type 
of risks and often have more expertise and precise knowledge compared 
to a third-party insurer.83 In this sense, they can evaluate the risk that 
each member creates and can better monitor the behavior of other 
fishermen members. 
Also particular features of FMI are geared towards remedying 
adverse selection. Theoretically adverse selection can be controlled if 
private insurers efficiently collect in a risk pool individuals with a nar-
row range of risk exposure, so the insurance remains financially 
attractive to each member of the pool.84 Based on the past performance 
of fishery insurance in the early 1990s, the private market itself could 
hardly cure the problem of adverse selection due to unfavorable features 
of fishery activities. In an FMI setting, as the number of members 
gradually increases, the pooling funded by their contributions is 
expanded, which enhances the capabilities of FMI to share risks. Since 
FMI associations only offer several types of basic products (mutual in-
surance of fishing vessels and cover for personal injury), and the ma-
jority of the members are individual fishermen from the same local area, 
the risk differentiation and control of moral hazard become more 
feasible. When fishermen are grouped in a way that those with a similar 
possibility of loss are charged the same rate, and the contribution to be 
charged for coverage equals the expected losses for the fishermen being 
insured, a risk differentiation system can be established. Therefore, 
more fishermen and owners of small-scale fishing vessels would be 
willing and also able to pay the price. The problem of asymmetric in-
formation is therefore less of a concern with risk-sharing as members of 
the pool have much better information on the risks posed by each in-
dividual member than an insurer. 
Another crucial difference between risk-sharing and insurance is that 
under insurance a premium is paid to the insurer which is not recover-
able by the insurer, no matter whether the risk materialized or not. To 
finance a risk-sharing pool, operators can either make advanced pay-
ments or make an ex ante agreement to pay retrospective premiums after 
the damage.85 If the pool members make an advanced payment, the 
contributions can be carried over to the following year if there is no 
accident. In other words: an operator does not lose his contribution if no 
accident happened. Moreover, compared to a third party insurer, the 
operators potentially possess better knowledge about the risks, methods 
of risk-assessment control as well as mutual monitoring. A risk-sharing 
agreement can therefore help to keep the costs to operate such a 
compensation mechanism lower, compared to insurance.86 
The FMIs do not only engage in an ex ante risk classification, but also 
in experience rating (adapting the premium based on the loss experi-
ence). Since this FMI is a voluntary mechanism, fishermen members may 
choose to leave the pool after a term. Alternatively, if they are willing to 
stay in the pool via renewing their membership, there is an incentive 
system called ‘no-claim bonus’ to reward them under specific circum-
stances. This no-claim bonus (NCB) is a discount in contribution (pre-
mium) offered by the FMI associations (insurer) if its fishermen 
members have not made a single claim during the term of the policy. It is 
introduced under the policy of fishing vessel mutual insurance by FMI 
associations of Zhejiang and Ningbo.87 The policymakers expect this 
NCB can be an incentive to fishermen for improving their care-taking 
level during fishery activities, where the possibility of moral hazard 
can be reduced. The costs of accident avoidance and the accident costs 
will consequently be reduced.88 Members of both fishing vessel mutual 
insurance and employer’s liability mutual insurance can only enjoy NCB 
in cases where no claim has been recorded in the official system within 
365 days.89 In 2017, all the members of the Ningbo FMI Association with 
no claim were entitled to receive 10% of their contribution as a reward 
for good behavior.90 
The control of moral hazard does not only consist in ex ante and ex 
post monitoring and an adaptation of the policy conditions. In line with 
the theory91 the members of the pool are also partially exposed to risk by 
applying a deductible. A FMI deductible refers to the amount paid out- 
of-pocket for the losses before FMI associations will pay the remaining 
costs. In the Policy of Employer’s Liability Mutual Insurance of CFMI 
(2017), the deductible amount of medical expenses is capped at CNY 
100 per accident.92 In contrast, a percentage deductible applies under 
the Policy of Fishing Vessel Mutual Insurance of CFMI (2017). To be spe-
cific, in cases where an insured fishing vessel has a total or partial loss 
caused by collision, the deductible amount is 30% if no liability of any 
vessel can be proven. The deductible amount is 20% if the accident is 
due to improper operation of the insured vessel, or 10% if a fire causes 
the accident in the event of daily activities (i.e., cooking).93 For 
example, if a fishing vessel that is insured for CNY 100.000 collides with 
another vessel, and the owner of this vessel cannot provide any infor-
mation concerning the potential liability of the other vessel, the 
deductible policy of 30% applies. Therefore, an amount of CNY 30.000 
would be deducted from his claim payment. Applying deductibles in the 
80 Bennett, P. (2001). Mutual risk: P&I insurance clubs and maritime safety 
and environmental performance. Marine Policy, vol. 25 (1), p. 15.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Skogh, G. (1999). Risk-sharing institutions for unpredictable losses. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), vol. 155(3), pp. 505–515.  
83 Faure, M., & Fiore, K. (2008). The coverage of the nuclear risk in Europe: 
Which alternative? Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, vol. 
33(2), pp. 288–322.  
84 Porrini, Donatella (2015), Risk classification efficiency and the insurance 
market regulation. Risks, vol.3, pp.445–454; also, see Akerlof G A.(1978), The 
market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Uncer-
tainty in economics. Academic Press, pp. 235–251.  
85 Faure, M. & Fiore, K.(2008), The coverage of the nuclear risk in Europe: 
which alternative? The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practices, 
vol. 33(2), pp. 301–302. 
86 Liu J., Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol. 18 (2), p. 262.  
87 Clause 34 of the Policy of Fishing Vessel Mutual Insurance of Zhejiang FMI 
Association (2010), stating that ‘insured fishing vessels with no claims during 
the period of mutual insurance enjoy a privilege of rewards when renewing its 
policy,’ available at http://www.zfmi.com/zfmi/news/20100608142828 
NIJHXUDKNSVTRVJYVFKVAY.html (in Chinese) (last accessed on December 
6, 2019).  
88 Liu J., Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol. 18(2), p. 257.  
89 The time requirement of no claim in 365 days, meaning no claim is required 
from January 1 to December 31 in one year.  
90 CFMI, The Ningbo FMI Association promoted a new policy of no-claim 
bonus in 2017, available at http://www.cfmi.org.cn/index.php?m=content 
&c=index&a=show&catid=20&id=2460 (in Chinese) (last accessed on 
December 11, 2019). 
91 More particularly, see Steven Shavell (1979), On moral hazard and insur-
ance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 541–562.  
92 Clause 28 (3) of the Policy of Employer’s Liability Mutual Insurance of CFMI 
(2017).  
93 Clauses 29–30 of the Policy of Fishing Vessel Mutual Insurance of CFMI 
(2017). 
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FMI is done for two reasons: first, to incentivize members to improve 
their care-taking level and thus mitigate moral hazard; second, to reduce 
the frequency of handling claims with the compensation claims of small 
amounts, in order to minimize the administrative costs. 
Recall that in the 1980s ship owners were aware of the substantial 
risks they were exposed to, but they were still unwilling to buy insurance 
given the relatively high premium and the absence of any incentive for 
risk prevention (i.e., rewarding the good risks with lower premiums). As 
a result, the number of insureds became so small that it became virtually 
impossible to constitute a pool within insurance to cover the risk. That 
again drove commercial insurers to charge even higher premiums from 
the limited number of insured. More insured fishermen, especially those 
with few accident records (people with good risks), tended to leave the 
pool while the remaining ones were the insureds with bad risks and a 
high possibility of accidents. In other words, there was thus a tendency 
of these fishermen in high-risk activities with bad performance records 
to purchase fishery insurance. In the end, commercial insurers that 
incurred severe losses could not make ends meet and pulled out of this 
fishery insurance market. That problem of adverse selection could only 
be countered through risk differentiation (more particularly also 
rewarding the good risks to keep them in the pool), but that requires 
adequate information. That information was apparently not available 
with the (monopolistic) central insurer (the PICC), but is available with 
the locally organized risk-sharing pools of fishermen, thus explaining 
why the risk-sharing FMIs succeeded where the insurance failed.94 
Risk-sharing agreements have, compared to insurance, quite a few 
advantages. Yet, it should be understood that those advantages can only 
be materialized if the specific conditions under which risk-sharing 
agreements emerge, are also present: usually these agreements emerge 
between operators who are in some way closely connected, possess 
similar risks and have good information about the risk profile of the 
other members and thus are able to engage in mutual monitoring at 
relatively low costs. For fishermen in particular coastal provinces in 
China, those conditions may be met, which might explain why risk- 
sharing agreements emerged. 
3.4. Scope of the coverage and prepaid contributions 
Section 4.3 already mentioned that via the deductible under FMIs 
fishermen are still (partially) exposed to risk. This is, as we argued, not a 
bad thing as it can be an important tool to control the moral hazard. 
Moreover, there are more limits within the current FMI policies. FMI 
offers two kinds of basic mutual insurance regarding fishing vessels and 
personal injury (including employer’s liability mutual insurance). 
Additionally, a pilot program of the aquaculture sector has been initi-
ated in some provinces, and the subsidies on aquaculture are only 
available in several local governments,95 but it is excluded from the CNY 
10 million subsidy program provided by the Central Government. In 
practice, there is a gap between the limited coverage provided by FMI 
and the uncovered risks arising from fishery industries. 
There is one other feature of a risk-sharing agreement which is that in 
theory each member’s contribution can be agreed upon on beforehand 
and only actually paid ex post. This feature makes it possible for RSAs to 
deal with uncertain risks, for which the statistical data about the 
occurrence are rare, or the probability and size are less predictable.96 
However, under current FMI policies, an ex ante charge of contributions 
is still necessary.97 In order to minimize costs, potential risk-creators are 
expected to be given optimal incentives to reduce the accident risk, 
which means the contributions provided by fishermen members should 
reflect the actual risks that they create. Since the amount of contribution 
should be determined in advance, accurate risk-related information is 
still required in an FMI setting, where ex ante information about the 
probability of a particular risk and its magnitude should be available to 
allow the calculation of an ex ante premium charged.98 Even though 
sometimes an FMI mechanism is formulated by a group of fishermen in 
the same or neighboring fishing village, and the problem of asymmetric 
information may not be as severe as under commercial insurance, the 
expenses on information are still needed. 
This shows that the FMIs have followed many of the specific features 
of risk-sharing agreements as they are advanced in the literature, but 
that some elements, such as the ex post determination of the individual 
contributions have not been followed. 
3.5. Systemic risk, correlation and scale 
The risks to which the fishermen are exposed can well be of such a 
magnitude that they could be considered as catastrophic. The capacity of 
individual insurers may be too limited to deal with catastrophic risk; 
moreover, when a catastrophe (like a hurricane) happens, there is a 
danger that all fishermen are equally affected and that there is therefore 
a high degree of correlation. 
The Chinese FMI model has in various ways tried to deal with those 
difficulties related to the supply of cover. The description of the various 
models used to implement FMI made clear that multiple instruments are 
adopted to increase the scale of the coverage. Traditionally reinsurance, 
pooling by insurers and coinsurance are advanced as remedies to in-
crease the capacity of insurers, especially in case of systemic risks.99 
Various examples are worked out of partnerships between the risk- 
sharing FMIs and commercial insurers, whereby insurers either co- 
insure the risk with the FMI or undertake reinsurance.100 Such a part-
nership between risk-sharing by operators and commercial insurers does 
make sense. The primary risk is run by the operators gathered in the 
FMIs who can through their superior information better engage in 
mutual monitoring and risk differentiation. Yet, their scale may be 
relatively limited as a result of which the collaboration with insurers (via 
co- or reinsurance) may have the advantage of increasing capacity, thus 
being able to provide cover also for higher amounts. From the models 
described above,101 it was clear that a variety of collaborations exist 
between the central CFMI and the local FMIs (consisting of co- or rein-
surance), but also between FMI associations and commercial insurers. 
94 Obviously, we do realize that we are merely suggesting a correlation here 
and can not prove with absolute certainty that it is only the lacking information 
with the PICC that caused the failure of insurance for fishermen in the 1990s. 
The fact that the PICC was (and is) a state-owned monopoly may also have 
reduced its incentives for adequate monitoring and risk differentiation, prob-
ably thus adding to the inefficiencies found.  
95 See supra section 2.3. 
96 Liu J, Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol.18 (2), pp.255–273.  
97 See Clause 20 of the Policy of Fishing Vessel Mutual Insurance of CFMI (2017), 
where it states that ‘members should pay out the contribution in a lump sum. The 
contract will not come into enforce until the payout is fully given by the members.’ 
The similar requirements are also given under Clause 4.1of the Policy of Personal 
Accident Mutual Insurance of CFMI (2017) (中国渔业互保协会渔民人身平安互助 
保险条款) and Clause 17 of the Policy of Employer’s Liability Mutual Insurance of 
CFMI (2017) (中国渔业互保协会雇主责任互助保险条款).  
98 Liu J., Faure M. (2018), Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental 
damage: theory and practice. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, vol. 18 (2), pp. 255–273.  
99 See Faure M., Hartlief T. (2003), Insurance and expanding systemic risks. 
Financial Market Trends, pp.145–156.   
100 See supra sections 2.4–2.5.   
101 See supra section 2.5. 
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Increasing the scale of the pool is also of importance in order to 
improve the risk spreading and thus dealing with the risk of correla-
tion.102 A full integration between the different risk pools has not been 
realized in China. CFMI runs its business nationwide, but it has over 20 
local offices at the local levels, which are isolated from other provincial 
FMI associations. As a result, in principle each FMI association manages 
its own pool and only shares the risks within that particular area (unless 
arrangements of co- or reinsurance would have been concluded). 
Usually the fishermen are gathered within their local FMI as these 
FMIs are also locally organized at the provincial level. However, in case 
of weather-related disasters, the fishery risks covered by one FMI can 
also affect the risks of other FMIs, which is precisely the danger of 
correlation. Since one local FMI may not have a large enough risk pool to 
compensate for the losses, collaboration with other FMIs is necessary. 
This collaboration is especially necessary for systemic risk which 
could relate to disastrous weather events, hurricanes, floods, earth-
quakes or major snow storms.103 An extreme weather disaster, such as a 
tropical storm or a typhoon which would occur in a sea area in China, 
can cause enormous damage to a number of individual fishermen and 
fishery companies in that area. By way of illustration, Typhoon Maria 
crashed ashore in Fujian Province with enormous damages in July 2018, 
the direct economic loss of which was over CNY 8900 million and at 
least 109 aquaculture farmers were affected.104 The Fujian FMI Asso-
ciation was in a partnership with the insurance company (PICC Fujian 
branch). A total amount of CNY 36.9 million was compensated for these 
affected aquaculture farmers within one month. With the support of 
commercial insurers, it seemed possible for a local FMI association to 
tackle the consequences of a natural disaster. The Fujian Province is a 
coastal province that frequently experiences weather disasters from May 
to September. The question arises whether the Fujian FMI Association 
could handle several compensation claims arising from different ty-
phoons which occurred sometime in the summer. Moreover, the FMI 
model mentioned only applies to the areas of Shanghai and Fujian, 
which again indicates the necessity for FMIs to collaborate with com-
mercial insurers via co- or reinsurance. Some FMIs already have worked 
out those types of collaborations, but others have not. For the latter, an 
effective supply of sufficient capacity is obviously far more problematic. 
That raises the question of the desirability of state intervention as it can 
indeed be found, not surprisingly, in China. 
3.6. State intervention 
State intervention in the compensation for victims of disasters (either 
via direct compensation or by promoting insurability) is certainly not 
only a Chinese feature but can be found in many countries. Provided that 
the government support would mimic market conditions (for example, 
via risk differentiation), the support should not necessarily be 
inefficient.105 
A first type of state intervention which can be found with respect to 
the FMIs in China relates to administrative support in the setting-up and 
running of the FMIs. As mentioned above,106 the central CFMI is regu-
lated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and local au-
thorities (more particularly provinces) have been material in the 
promotion of the FMIs at the level of the provinces. The service offices of 
fishery mutual insurance (FMI office) are set up at various fishing ports 
or fishing villages.107 More importantly, these FMI offices in practice are 
merged into the bureau of the fishery at local levels. Although the FMI 
association is a nonprofit organization, this current risk-sharing agree-
ment is highly dependent on the government. A local agency subjected 
to the bureau of the fishery is usually established to take charge of 
fishery activities, the duties of which include receiving claims from 
fishermen, investigating cases, evaluating damages, and settling 
cases.108 Generally, the officers of the bureau will undertake the 
investigation and evaluation, which means the investigator at the acci-
dent scene and the administrator of the bureau of fisheries who takes 
charge of this case is the same person. Although this settlement pro-
cedure may solve claims rapidly, it could create another form of moral 
hazard: corrupt officers may connive with fishermen to jointly file a false 
claim to the risk-sharing agreement and share the proceeds.109 
The government (at different levels) therefore plays an active role in 
the administrative management of the FMIs. The mere fact that the 
government in many cases stimulated the creation of the risk-sharing 
agreement can be considered as positive. The problem is that even 
though the creation of a risk-sharing agreement could in many cases be 
beneficial, in some cases it simply does not emerge because an orches-
trator who takes the initiative to create the risk-sharing agreement is 
lacking.110 The role of the government can therefore be important in 
taking the first step and bringing operators together in the risk-sharing 
agreement. Moreover, the combination of different tasks (fisheries bu-
reaus and claims management) could equally be beneficial as the gov-
ernment could use the information it acquired in its regulatory capacity 
to facilitate claim management. There have been other examples where 
the government intervened in providing disaster insurance and could do 
so efficiently by combining its regulatory possibilities (e.g., regulating 
102 A further discussion on this problem of correlation in insurance, see Ken-
neth S. Abraham (2011), Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of Insurance. 
Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 64, p. 1788.   
103 Skees J R, Barnett B J.(1999), Conceptual and practical considerations for 
sharing catastrophic/systemic risks. Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 21(2), 
pp. 424–441.   
104 Li, Wenping, The New considering FMI Compensation for economic losses 
arising from Typhoon Marina in Fujian Province (2018-07-20), available at htt 
p://www.oceanol.com/fangzai/201807/20/c79325.html (in Chinese) (last 
accessed on December 11, 2019). 
105 For further details see Bruggeman, V., Faure, M.G. & Fiore, K.(2010), The 
Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophic Risks? Geneva Papers on Risk and In-
surance, vol. 35, pp. 369–390. Also see, Bruggeman, V., Faure, M.G. & Heldt, T. 
(2012), Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance 
Markets for Catastrophic Events, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, vol. 
XXIII(1), pp. 185–241.   
106 See supra section 2.2.   
107 Yang Wensheng (2012), The research on operating conditions of the fishery 
mutual insurance of Shandong Province (in Chinese), Insurance Studies, No. 6, p. 
51.   
108 Wu Shuai, Yu Wenbao, Liu Jiazhao (2012), Exploration of Introducing 
Evaluation Mechanism into Fishery Mutual Insurance (in Chinese), Journal of 
Qingdao Mariner College, vol. 33 (3), pp. 11–13.   
109 Ibid.   
110 See Grossmann, S. & Faure, M (2016), Conditions for Effective Risk Sharing 
against Marine Pollution: The Case of the Ria de Vigo, Environmental Liability, 
vol. 24 (2), p. 59. 
M. Jiang and M. Faure                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
11
disaster risk reduction) and premiums.111 However, whether the state 
intervention in the administration of the FMIs and claims handling in the 
Chinese case is always efficient, is of course questionable, especially 
when the intervention of corrupt officials could lead to the compensa-
tion of unjustified claims. 
A second way of intervening in this scheme by the Chinese govern-
ment consists simply of a direct allocation of money to compensate the 
affected fishermen after the accident. This type of direct compensation is 
strongly debated in the literature. To the extent that it merely consists of 
providing immediate relief after a disaster (such as providing shelter and 
immediate help), it has been argued that this will not negatively affect 
the incentives to invest in disaster risk reduction ex ante.112 However, 
when the government intervention consists of more generous ex post 
compensation, this has been criticized as a “catastrophic response to 
catastrophic risk”.113 Ex post recovery can reduce the incentives to invest 
in preventive measures; it is referred to as the “charity hazard.“114 A 
related problem is that victims may be counting on government 
compensation which may dilute the incentives to purchase insurance or 
to seek cover via other means. Government-provided compensation can 
lead potential victims to free ride on the state and dilute the incentives to 
purchase insurance.115 These problems are also likely to occur in the 
case of government compensation to fishermen: the government 
compensation may lead fishermen to lose their interest in joining an 
FMI; moreover, the possibility of free-riding on the government could 
also drive more high-risk fishermen to join the market. In the long run, it 
can be detrimental to establish a financial mechanism in favor of con-
trolling and sharing risks via pooling. A worse situation is that such a 
temporary policy, designed to resist fishery risks, could lead to the slack 
of fishermen’s production and even change the motives for FMI.116 
A third possible way of intervention by the government is to provide 
subsidies for the payment of the premium. Above section 2.3.2 sketched 
that in most provinces generous subsidies are provided covering 
approximately (20%–80%) of the premium.117 Whereas the law and 
economics literature is generally critical of direct compensation to vic-
tims by the government, the same is not the case for subsidizing 
insurance premiums. If individuals in disaster-prone areas lack capacity 
to pay insurance premiums, the government could provide insurance 
vouchers or victims could be reimbursed by the government for a 
portion of the increased costs of insurance coverage. The advantage of 
subsidizing premiums rather than providing direct compensation is that 
premiums would still reflect risk and would create a risk awareness with 
the insured. Moreover, through the voucher system individuals could 
still be incentivized to adopt risk-reducing measures.118 Coate equally 
argued that if the government makes in-kind transfers of insurance to 
the poor, they will not rely on disaster relief ex post in case of a loss.119 
The subsidization of insurance premiums can thus avoid the charity 
hazard.120 
The government in China uses both subsidies on premiums and 
financial support to fishermen.121 Several methods are often mixed to 
promote FMI. For example, in the Shandong province: the Shandong 
Oceanic and Fishery Department offers a certain amount of funds to the 
Shandong FMI Association annually since 2006, where both the asso-
ciation and its fishermen members are covered.122 Meanwhile, the 
Shandong Tax Bureau announced to offer policies in favor of fishery 
mutual insurance, determining that contributions subsidized by the 
government are exempted from business tax.123 If the government 
considers that the affordability of premiums is problematic for particular 
segments of the population, the better way of intervention is via sub-
sidization of insurance premiums, rather than providing direct 
compensation of losses to fishermen. Subsidizing premiums still allows 
premiums to correctly reflect risk (thus raising risk awareness among 
fishermen) and can promote prevention by making the subsidy depen-
dent upon the implementation of preventive measures. 
3.7. A duty to obtain cover? 
A general problem with disaster insurance is that risk perception 
concerning these low probability high damage events is often poor: 
potential victims often underestimate risks, systematically misjudge the 
likelihood of a natural disaster, resulting in an “it will not happen to me” 
attitude.124 A result is that demand for disaster insurance is often low.125 
These problems seem to be persistent in the case of fishery insurance 
in China as well. Under the commercial insurance scheme the coverage 
111 Examples of these types of “efficient monopolies” have especially been 
studied in the case of the Swiss cantons where state-provided insurance could 
equally provide incentives for disaster risk reduction. See in this respect espe-
cially see von Ungern-Sternberg, T. (2004), Efficient monopolies: the limits of 
competition in the European property insurance market. Oxford University 
Press on Demand, p.106. The Swiss model works effectively since the cantons 
are liable for damage payments as insurers and it provides the cantons with 
incentives to use their public powers to require preventive efforts. See also 
Emons, W.(2001), Imperfect tests and natural insurance monopolies, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, vol. 49, pp. 251–255.   
112 Dari-Mattiacci, G., Faure M. (2015), The Economics of Disaster Relief, Law 
& Policy, vol. 37 (3), pp. 180–208.   
113 Epstein, R.A.(1996), Catastrophic responses to catastrophic risks’, Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 12, pp. 287–308.   
114 Rachsky, P. and Weck-Hannemann, H.(2007), Charity hazard – real hazard 
to natural disaster insurance, Environmental Hazard, vol. 7, pp. 321–329.   
115 Gron, A. and Sykes, A.O.(2002), A role for government? Regulation, vol. 25 
(4), pp. 44–51.   
116 Zekri S, Mbaga M D, Boughanmi H.(2008), Fishermen willingness to 
participate in an insurance program in Oman. Marine Resource Economics, vol. 
23(3), pp. 379–391. Also, see Jia Qingru, Chen Shengwei (2015), Analysis of 
the Development and Dilemma of Fishery Insurance in China (in Chinese), 
Shandong Agriculture Science, 2015, 47(8), p. 149.   
117 See supra section 2.3. 
118 See Kunreuther, H.(2008), ‘Catastrophe insurance: challenges for the US 
and Asia’, in Scawthorn, Ch. And Kobayashi, K. (eds.), Asian catastrophe in-
surance, London, Risk Books, p. 13.   
119 Coate, S.(1995), Altruism, the Samaritan’s dilemma and the government 
transfer policy, American Economic Review, vol. 85, pp. 46–57.   
120 Harrington, S.E. and Niehaus, G. (2001), Government insurance, tax policy 
and the affordability and availability of catastrophe insurance, Journal of In-
surance Regulation, vol. 19, pp. 591–612.   
121 Jin Lingen, Li Juan (2003), The promotion of establishing a fishery insur-
ance mechanism with national support (in Chinese), Chinese Fisheries Economics, 
pp. 35–37.   
122 Yang Wensheng (2012), The research on operating conditions of the fishery 
mutual insurance of Shandong Province (in Chinese), Insurance Studies, no. 6, 
pp. 49–57. The announcement of tax exemption for the Shandong FMI Asso-
ciation was issued in August 2006.   
123 Ibid.   
124 Kunreuther, H. (1996), ‘Mitigating disaster losses through insurance’, 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 12, p. 175.   
125 Faure, M.G. & Bruggeman, V.(2009), Catastrophic Risks and First-Party 
Insurance, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, vol. 15 (1), pp. 14–26. 
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amounted to 10.6% in 1986, decreasing to 5.8% of all vessels in 1995.126 
The risk-sharing agreement under the FMIs apparently enabled an in-
crease in the number of fishermen covered, amounting to 20% for 
fishing vessel mutual insurance and 40% for personal accident mutual 
insurance in 2013.127 Yet, a mere cover of 20% still remains relatively 
low. Also in other cases, it has been found that the mere fact that pre-
miums are subsidized will not automatically increase demand for 
disaster insurance. One example constitutes the National Flood Insur-
ance Plan (NFIP) in the US. Notwithstanding the fact that premiums for 
flood insurance under the NFIP received high subsidies the demand for 
this flood insurance generally remains low.128 Given the systematic 
underestimation of disaster risks, Kunreuther argued already in 1968 in 
favor of mandatory disaster insurance.129 That then raises the question 
of whether membership by fishermen in the mutual should be made 
compulsory. A risk-sharing agreement is, in essence, a voluntary 
arrangement among business operators. However, in the absence of a 
duty to join or some other legislation that gives the market a gentle 
nudge in the right direction, it is likely that the mutual would not come 
into being or that it would not be able to acquire sufficient members. 
Mandatory membership could also avoid free-riding (on the govern-
ment) of those fishermen who have not joined an FMI and would expect 
to be compensated ex post by the government. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The fishery is a high-risk activity. The perils at sea may lead to 
personal injury (loss of life or injuries), but also to large economic losses. 
The ship could be lost in a storm, which often constitutes the only asset 
possessed by the individual fisherman. Sometimes losses are to one or a 
few fishermen, but in other cases (especially when losses are related to 
bad weather events), they could be systemic and even catastrophic, 
affecting the entire sector. China tried to provide financial compensation 
to fishermen by creating commercial insurance via the (state-owned) 
monopolistic insurer. That attempt, however, largely failed due to 
unsurmountable problems of adverse selection: only high-risk in-
dividuals joined the insurance, leading to losses being larger than 
premium-income. In the 1990s, an alternative was developed, both at 
the central level and within the Chinese provinces of “fishery mutual 
insurance” (FMI), basically a risk-sharing agreement between commer-
cial actors active in fishery. Where commercial insurance failed, the risk- 
sharing agreement seemed to work better, which is largely in line with 
the literature that indicated that, under particular conditions, risk- 
sharing agreements may be better able to control risks than insurers, 
thus remedying the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The Chinese government authorities played an important role in 
stimulating the creation of FMIs. Again, it had been seen more often that 
even when risk-sharing agreements between operators could be optimal, 
they were not always created because there is no orchestrator to take the 
initiative to launch. This is where government authorities at various 
levels in China stepped in. 
The government, moreover, also subsidizes in different ways. On the 
one hand, direct compensation to fishermen is provided, which is highly 
debated given the negative effects it may have on ex ante incentives for 
prevention. The better alternative of subsidizing premiums is also fol-
lowed. That at least allows a risk-awareness among operators and avoids 
too strong negative effects for prevention (in the case of outright 
compensation). 
The case of fishery insurance in China is interesting as it shows that 
in practice the choice is not between either pure commercial insurance 
or risk-sharing by operators but that various models may exist striving 
for collaborative solutions between both. In many Chinese provinces 
commercial insurers still intervene as reinsurers or in coinsurance with 
the FMIs. That may have the advantage of combining the superior in-
formation by the FMIs with the increasing scale facilitated by the 
intervention of the commercial insurers. 
Even though many features of the FMI in China are in line with the 
law and economics literature, there are also points where the systems 
deviate and which therefore provide room for improvement. One 
problem is that currently FMIs are organized at the local level and that 
there is little integration or collaboration between the different FMIs, 
which would enable a larger scale of cover. Another problem is that, 
notwithstanding generous government subsidies on premiums, on 
average still only 20% of all fishing boats joined the FMIs, still leaving 
large quantities uncovered (potentially counting on ex post government 
compensation and thus subject to the charity hazard). That raises the 
question of whether membership in the FMIs should be made compul-
sory in line with the literature that has pleaded in favor of compre-
hensive disaster insurance. However, that regulatory intervention also 
raises a number of questions, among which whether it really corre-
sponds with the preferences of the fishermen (assuming that the lacking 
demand is the result of lacking information or behavioral biases), as 
otherwise, the regulatory intervention may amount to paternalism. 
The mere fact that many different FMIs exist at local levels in China 
and that they are organized according to different models (of collabo-
ration with insurers or governments) also provides an interesting scope 
for a comparative study of these various models. As especially for new 
and catastrophic risks, where commercial insurers may be reluctant to 
provide cover, risk-sharing agreements among operators may become 
increasingly important the case of fishery mutual insurance provides 
many opportunities to learn from China. 
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